Wednesday, December 17, 2003
The Contract Thing
William Kristol and Robert Kagan have written an article in the Weekly Standard (http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/481yjxxw.asp) that criticizes the Bush administration for its "petty" refusal to allow contracts for the construction of Iraq to be awarded to Germany, France, and Russia. This is a legitimate position, I suppose, but what got me thinking was one of the underlying suppositions. Namely, that the U.S. should be "magnanimous" in victory, and not "reward friends and punish enemies".
Magnanimity in victory is indeed an important quality for the civilized victor. However, it rests on the idea that the magnanimity is extended to one's defeated enemies on the battlefield. It is interesting that Kristol and Kagan refer in passing to the nations who blocked the U.S. in the Security Council as "friendly governments", while referring to the Administration's plan to "punish enemies". I don't think they meant that France, Germany and Russia are our enemies in the same way Iraq was, so I think he is conflating two concepts: the concept of ostensible allies who act against our interests (in this case, in direct opposition to our goal), and actual enemies who defy us militarily.
This takes us to contemplate what "enemy" actually means. Certainly the Axis Of Weasels actively undermined our efforts to remove Saddam, just as Hussein did. However, we did not face them on the battlefield, because they were not the enemy to be engaged, but our nominal allies who decided to thwart our effort to decisively defeat an enemy (that, it turns out, two of whom were conducting business with in violation of U.N. sanctions, and the third who wanted oil contracts preserved at all costs). So, in the sense of active warfare upon the U.S., they are not enemies, but neither are they our friends, even though they may still be our allies. But certainly they are not deserving of our magnanimity. That is to be extended to the honorable but vanquished foe on the battleground, and his countrymen, not to the chunks of perfidy that comprise the AOW. They may even have now demonstrated that they are our de facto enemies (or, to put it in a parlance diplomats may understand, "hold views permanently antithetical to our interests"), but they are still undeserving of magnanimity, because they are not ruined, just inconvenienced by not receiving windfall precipitated by actions they wholly opposed.
Those who worked so assiduously against the U.S. to prevent our foreign-policy objective do not deserve violent confrontation, certainly, but neither do they deserve to be enriched by contracts to rebuild a country whose people they risked nothing for. And if that sounds too high-flown and moralistic, then they also do not deserve to be rewarded simply because they worked so hard against an ally's request for help, and have cheered every setback against the U.S. And this latter position doesn't even need to be evaluated in terms of good of evil, but merely in terms of recalcitrance. Why should the U.S. reward those who worked for exactly the opposite outcome of what actually happened? It seems insane to me, but then I'm not a diplomat. ¶ 17:17
Magnanimity in victory is indeed an important quality for the civilized victor. However, it rests on the idea that the magnanimity is extended to one's defeated enemies on the battlefield. It is interesting that Kristol and Kagan refer in passing to the nations who blocked the U.S. in the Security Council as "friendly governments", while referring to the Administration's plan to "punish enemies". I don't think they meant that France, Germany and Russia are our enemies in the same way Iraq was, so I think he is conflating two concepts: the concept of ostensible allies who act against our interests (in this case, in direct opposition to our goal), and actual enemies who defy us militarily.
This takes us to contemplate what "enemy" actually means. Certainly the Axis Of Weasels actively undermined our efforts to remove Saddam, just as Hussein did. However, we did not face them on the battlefield, because they were not the enemy to be engaged, but our nominal allies who decided to thwart our effort to decisively defeat an enemy (that, it turns out, two of whom were conducting business with in violation of U.N. sanctions, and the third who wanted oil contracts preserved at all costs). So, in the sense of active warfare upon the U.S., they are not enemies, but neither are they our friends, even though they may still be our allies. But certainly they are not deserving of our magnanimity. That is to be extended to the honorable but vanquished foe on the battleground, and his countrymen, not to the chunks of perfidy that comprise the AOW. They may even have now demonstrated that they are our de facto enemies (or, to put it in a parlance diplomats may understand, "hold views permanently antithetical to our interests"), but they are still undeserving of magnanimity, because they are not ruined, just inconvenienced by not receiving windfall precipitated by actions they wholly opposed.
Those who worked so assiduously against the U.S. to prevent our foreign-policy objective do not deserve violent confrontation, certainly, but neither do they deserve to be enriched by contracts to rebuild a country whose people they risked nothing for. And if that sounds too high-flown and moralistic, then they also do not deserve to be rewarded simply because they worked so hard against an ally's request for help, and have cheered every setback against the U.S. And this latter position doesn't even need to be evaluated in terms of good of evil, but merely in terms of recalcitrance. Why should the U.S. reward those who worked for exactly the opposite outcome of what actually happened? It seems insane to me, but then I'm not a diplomat. ¶ 17:17
